Though very widely believed to be inadequate in the target it sets, the Paris Agreement is commonly thought actually to set a binding target of reducing global CO 2 e emissions so as to limit global warming to 2°C. Proper legal interpretation of the Agreement shows it to set no such target. It rather gives the newly industrialising countries such as China and India a permission to emit as much as they see fit. These countries have been principally responsible for the huge growth in emissions since 1990 and they will be responsible for their continued huge growth until 2030. The Paris Agreement therefore makes the policy of mitigation of global warming impossible. This, however, has been the case over the now more than a quarter century of international climate change policy.
Introduction
At the kind invitation of the Editor, I have submitted this article, which is a revised version of Evidence submitted to the Inquiry into setting the UK's Fifth Carbon Budget by the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change [1] . 1 This Evidence was submitted in March 2016 and this revised version now attempts to state the law as of September 2016. As one would expect of an article with such an origin, it has little theoretical ambition. Written by an academic lawyer, it merely attempts to correct the common misinterpretation of the Paris Agreement (PA) [2] that it reaches a binding agreement to limit global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (CO 2 e) emissions. Rather, properly interpreted, the PA actually strengthens the permission to emit as much as they see fit to the developing countries which has been the core feature of international climate change law since the opening for signature of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) [3] in 1992. As the developing countries include the newly industrialising countries (NICs) such as China and India, and as the NICs are principally responsible for the huge growth in global emissions since 1990, and will be responsible for their continued huge growth through to 2030, this means that international climate change action under the PA cannot possibly meet its goals, and the policy of mitigation of global warming cannot possibly succeed. However, the impossibility of the mitigation policy has been the central feature of the entire history of international climate change action [4] , which one now might date back more than a quarter century to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1987 [5, para 5] .
Though, as I have said, this article is of limited theoretical ambition, I will conclude it with some brief reflections on the significance of the international climate change policy of mitigation for regulatory theory and practice.
A common misinterpretation
A convenient statement of the common misinterpretation of the PA which I seek to correct has been provided by the extremely widely read 'anti-capitalist' commentator and activist Naomi Klein in the Edward Said Lecture she delivered on 5 May 2016 [6] . Klein claimed that:
The Paris Agreement commits to keeping warming below 2°C. It's a target that is beyond reckless. When it was unveiled in Copenhagen in 2009, the African delegates called it "a death sentence". The slogan of several low-lying island nations is "1.5 to stay alive". At the last minute, a clause was added to the Paris Agreement that says countries will pursue 'efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C'. Not only is this non-binding but it is a lie: we are making no such efforts.
Klein here emphasised the common criticism of the PA for not doing nearly enough when it set the 2°C target and the level of global emissions reductions it implies, but she at least acknowledged the setting of a target. This is incorrect.
The first substantive provision of the PA, Art 2.1, provides:
This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the [FCCC], including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.
In order to evaluate Klein's interpretation of the PA it is necessary to take up Art 2.1's references to the 'objective' of the FCCC and to a '2°C' limit in some detail.
In Art 2.1, the FCCC states that its 'ultimate objective … is to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. This objective is obviously very vague, indeed it is tautological. Despite a profound concern to do so, international climate change negotiations between the FCCC and the PA were unable to set a concrete, legally binding target for warming, and therefore global emissions concentration, and for the global reductions necessary to achieve that target. Though I will not argue it here but merely refer the reader to earlier work [4; 8; 9; 10] , the concrete reductions required of developing countries by Art 3.1 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) [7] were unrelated to any global target Report produced by the UN Environment Programme [20] . EU diplomacy which began with the Council Conclusion being made the basis of the EU negotiating position at COP2 in Geneva, has led to the 2C target always appearing in reports of COP proceedings (but then only in such a way as to strictly divorce it from even the mere statement of any concrete commitment) between the KP and the PA, including in the CA. It no doubt strains the credulity of those not versed in the ways of transnational governance in general and EU governance in particular that one of the most important policies ever adopted could be adopted in this way, which has managed to completely avoid public justification of that adoption. But even recognising adoption of this sort, it is essential to distinguish this from actual agreement in international climate change law, which, to repeat, had not been achieved prior to the PA. (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.
It can be seen that this is not an agreement of the 2C or a 1. 
A change of strategy
One immediately thinks that the process just described must constitute a very profound failure of policy-making, and I am of the opinion that indeed it does. But it in fact follows from a change of strategy about binding targets and binding commitments by leading proponents of climate change policy which Klein is representative in failing to grasp. I have previously discussed this change of strategy as it was expounded by a particularly important figure, Lord Stern, in the run-up to COP21 in Paris to which I refer readers [10] , and I shall be brief here. Although, as we have seen, there has long been profound concern that international climate change negotiations were, to put it at the least, not making the progress 
What have the NIC's agreed to do?
For the failure to agree the 2C or any other target is by no means the worst failure of the PA.
Not merely is it not an agreement to reduce emissions, but it is an agreement to allow their We have seen that the FCCC imposed no concrete reductions commitments on either developed or developing countries. But, crucially, FCCC Art 4(7), and much other language to identical effect, provided that:
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the [FCCC] will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.
As, given foreseeable technology, emissions reductions which might significantly mitigate global warming must involve huge economic costs which seriously hinder poverty eradication, this provision means that there can be no significant limits placed on the emissions of developing countries which wish to pursue economic growth in order to eradicate poverty. And so, no caps have ever been placed on developing countries under the common but differentiated responsibilities strategy, because the FCCC Art 4(7) effectively stipulates that there cannot be. The common responsibilities of the developing countries are so differentiated that they do not exist. want here to discuss, not the Committee on Climate Change specifically, but carbon intensity in general. Reduction in carbon intensity and reduction in absolute emissions must be strongly distinguished. Carbon intensity is a measure of the amount of CO 2 e which must be emitted to obtain a certain increase in gross domestic product (gdp). Such a reduction carries no implication that it will involve an absolute reduction of emissions. Broadly speaking, absolute emissions and economic growth are strongly correlated, but, with increasing sophistication of technology, the rate at which growth requires emissions, that is to say, carbon intensity, falls. The history of western industrialisation is itself one of a reduction in carbon intensity which, without a technological miracle, will never be surpassed, but a reduction brought about, of course, by the immense growth in absolute emissions now blamed for anthropological global warming, a growth which now is in the course of being surpassed by the NICs.
In what follows I will, for reasons of brevity, discuss only China but the position is essentially the same for all the NICs including India, which is especially significant because India is in essence a duplicate of China, but running at least a decade behind. China's economic growth will, as the Committee on Climate Change claims, involve a reduction of carbon intensity as new plant is installed and old plant is retired. But reduction in carbon intensity may be perfectly consistent with unbounded absolute growth in emissions, depending on how much economic growth there is, and such are China's economic growth targets that its reductions in carbon intensity will be made, not despite but because of, a growth in absolute emissions. China will not retire existing generating capacity and replace it only with an equivalent or smaller capacity generated by lower intensity plant. It will retire older capacity in the course of an immense expansion of overall capacity. In such circumstances, as new plant is installed and old plant is retired, carbon intensity falls, but the fall is obtained through absolute growth of emissions, and the faster the fall in intensity, the greater the rise in absolute emissions. China's extremely ambitious and apparently positive intensity targets actually represent a statement that the increase in its emissions will be vast.
The situation is confirmed in China's INDC, 5 the burden of which is very similar to the position under the PA. The first thing to place firmly at the forefront of one's thinking is the immense size of China's population. At 1.3 billion, that population is a billion larger than that of the US and almost a billion larger than that of the EU. Since 1979, China has embarked on an enormously successful programme of economic growth and poverty relief. However, this success remains largely confined to its coastal cities. In its enormous hinterland, almost a billion people still live on less than US$5/day and almost half a billion on US$2.50. Despite the growth since 1979, the extent of this continuing poverty is reflected in China still being only the third largest economy in the world after the US and the EU regarded as a whole (though it is confidently predicted that by 2020 it will become clearly the largest), and China's emissions per capita still being less than 50% of the EU and less than 25% of the US. China's basic economic policy goal, stated in its economic plan and reiterated in its INDC [29, p 4] , is to create a 'moderately prosperous' society by 2020 and a 'prosperous' society by 2050. If this is, as it should be, taken to mean achieving a per capita gdp comparable to the west, it obviously will involve a further absolute growth of the Chinese economy that can only be described as astronomical. In particular, though China has been responsible for 80% of the almost doubling of world coal consumption this century, and though it now consumes as much coal as the rest of the world combined, its plan to 2030
involves a further almost doubling of coal-fired generation.
China's INDC must be read against this background. It [30, p 5] says that:
Based on its national circumstances, development stage, sustainable development strategy and international responsibility, China has nationally determined its actions by 2030 as follows:
• To achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 and making best efforts to peak early;
• To lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gdp by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level;
• To increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%
I must confess I do not understand the first of these commitments. It cannot mean a peaking in the growth of absolute emissions, because on foreseeable technology this would effectively mean a peaking in economic growth, and it is not conceivable that China would commit to this. I think it must refer to a peaking in the rate of growth of absolute emissions, related to a reduction in growth of gdp, down from the previous 10% per annum or the current 6.5% to levels comparable to the mature economies of the west. This would be consistent with the second commitment, which is to lower carbon intensity, the implications of which for absolute emissions reductions have already been discussed. The commitment to increase the share of non-fossil fuels will be part of the reduction in carbon intensity, but it is itself perfectly compatible with an increase in absolute emissions, and, as I have explained elsewhere [31] , this is exactly what will happen in the context of China's plans for growth. A growth in the small share of non-fossil fuels in China's energy mix will not prevent enormous growth in emissions by Chinese energy generation which is planned to double by 2030 and which will remain overwhelmingly dominated by fossil fuels, principally coal.
What is more, China's INDC [308, p 17] sets out the complete allocation of responsibility for absolute emissions reductions up to 2030 to the developed countries, and the corollary complete exemption from such responsibility of the developing countries, which was adopted in almost identical language in the PA:
The [PA] shall stipulate that the Parties, in accordance with the provisions of the [FCCC] , shall formulate and implement programs and measures to reduce or limit greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2020-2030 and promote international cooperation on mitigation. Developed countries shall, in accordance with their historical responsibilities, undertake ambitious economy-wide absolute quantified emissions reduction targets by 2030. Developing countries shall, in the context of sustainable development and supported and enabled by the provision of finance, technology and capacity building by developed countries, undertake diversifying enhanced mitigation actions.
In light of what has been said of the PA, further comment on the significance of this is supererogatory.
Conclusion
Considered as an exercise in regulation, the international climate change policy of mitigation of global warming could not really be more significant. As I have elsewhere [4] argued more extensively than I propose to do here, and so the reader is referred to that discussion for theoretical elaboration and referencing, that policy shows both familiar and novel features, and the novel features are remarkable. In a way which is so very familiar a part of the modern welfare economics case for government intervention that it has become central to educated public opinion, CO 2 e emissions are described as a 'negative externality' calling for the mitigation policy as an intervention necessary to obtain emissions reductions. There are, however, two principal novelties. First, coming in a period when faith in more direct, command and control styles of intervention had waned, the mitigation policy was to be based on the 'market-mimicking' strategy of 'carbon trading'. This can be put to one side. But, secondly, and of crucial relevance to us here, as emissions anywhere in the world can contribute to the increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 e, global warming is a global problem. The response has to be global, and the mitigation policy was the first intervention to be conducted at a truly global scale and scope. I have previously called international climate change policy 'global welfare economics' [4, pp 164-7] , but this feature of climate change policy has perhaps been better captured in the rather good pun on the environmental and global aspects of 'planetary economics' in the title of a book on the subject by a leading academic proponent of that policy [32] .
Behind the interpretation of the PA put forward in this paper lies the belief, which I formed more than a decade ago, that this enormously important development in regulatory theory and practice has been an absolute failure. This belief allowed me to predict the content of the PA, were a legally binding agreement to be reached in Paris [33] , though I must confess I was completely unsure whether any agreement would be reached. The basic legal agreement necessary for the mitigation policy to work has never been able to be put into place and indeed what has been agreed has categorically made that policy impossible from the start, impossible now, and impossible in the future. Lord Stern [34, p 1] has claimed that global warming is 'the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen'. It is at least as arguable that the international climate action policy of mitigation is the greatest example of peacetime government failure we have ever seen. [19], the International Energy Outlook [27] , the World Energy Outlook [28] and the Emissions Gap Report [20] .
